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1. Introduction 
 
This study examines to what extent the transition to the euro endogenously affected the alloca-
tion of capital across the European Union. Initiated in 1993, the Maastricht Treaty set out strict 
guidelines for member states to follow with the ultimate goal of adopting a single currency. The 
adoption of the common currency in 1999 concluded the European convergence process. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty serves as the blueprint for the eventual adoption of a common currency 
and identifies several macroeconomic convergence policies to be satisfied by all candidate coun-
tries before entrance into the European Monetary Union (EMU). The treaty presents the following 
convergence criteria: 
 
1.  candidate country inflation is no more than 1.5 percent above the average of the lowest 
three inflation rates in the European Monetary System (EMS);  
2.  the long-term interest rate of the candidate country is no more than 2 percent higher than 
the average of the low inflation countries in the EMS;  
3.  the candidate country is a member of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS and has 
not observed a devaluation in the two years preceding entrance into the EMU;  
4.  the candidate country government budget deficit is no higher than 3 percent of GDP; and  
5.  the candidate country government debt does not exceed 60 percent of GDP.  
 
Underlying the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria is the European Commission’s (1990) in-
terpretation of the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) first proposed by Mundell (1961). 
As we shall see, the five economic criteria in the Treaty of Maastricht are one definition of con-
vergence, and more precisely a macroeconomic definition of convergence. 
 
In order to address the positive or negative externalities of these criteria on the microeconomic 
level, this study proposes an empirical analysis of the endogenous OCA theory. The first original-
ity of this study is to employ an alternative measure to bilateral trade flows. Indeed, we chose to 
go back to the first intuition of the endogenous OCA theory found in Mundell (1973b), when he 
refers to the allocation of capital as a result of the use of a common currency. For this purpose, we 
will use the bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) flows as a proxy for the allocation of capital. 
 
The proxy for the allocation of capital is measured by multinational firm investment motivated 
by location specific advantages that offer firm level incentives for cross-border investment. The 
second originality is in the combination of this micro-approach (Hecksher-Ohlin variables) with 
the convergence measure (European macroeconomic aggregates). This approach is inspired by 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) who developed a theoretical model dealing with the micro-structure 
of national economies instead of bilateral trade: imperfect competition, nominal rigidities in the 
goods markets, and forward-looking price-setting by firms.  
 
We employ these microeconomic measures through an empirical analysis using a variation of the 
gravity model of international trade. Generalized, the gravity model explains a flow from country 
i to country j by economic forces at the flow's origin, the economic forces at the flows destination, 
and the forces aiding or resisting the movement of the flow from the origin to the destination.  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents background discussion of the en-
dogeneity argument with respect to European integration and its connection to multinational 
firm theory. Section 3 presents the methodology of the gravity model used in this study. Section 4 
follows with a discussion of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 provides some possible pol-
icy implications and conclusions. 
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2. Background literature 
 
The political discussions of the late 1970s following the inception of the ECU (European Currency 
Unit) focused on the likelihood of transforming this complementary currency to existing currencies 
into a perfect substitute to the same existing currencies. 
 
The OCA theory, first introduced by Mundell (1961) served to frame both the costs and benefits of 
monetary integration within this political discussion. Since then a vast literature has developed, 
with notable contributions by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). According to Frankel and Rose 
(1998), this literature focuses on four interrelationships between the members of a potential OCA: 
(1) the extent of trade; (2) the similarity of shocks and cycles; (3) the degree of labor mobility; and 
(4) the system of risk-sharing, usually through fiscal transfers. 
 
Given the suitable aspect of this literature for Europe integration, the European Commission 
(1990) started to work on the stages necessary to enter into an OCA. However, according to 
Eichengreen (1990), Europe at the time was clearly not an OCA. In order to make it become one 
before the use of a common currency, the Treaty of Maastricht was implemented in 1993 across 
the European Union to make countries converge. Five economic proxies had been used to insure 
the convergence on the three public policy dimensions: (1) the monetary policy (in a closed and 
open economy perspective); (2) the fiscal policy; and (3) the structural policy. The proxies were 
respectively: inflation, exchange rate, national debt, public deficit, and long-term interest rate. 
 
Although it was uncertain that Europe was an OCA before the inception of the euro (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1993, 1994, 1996), economic literature started to develop an e-OCA theory (to copy 
molecular scientists who created the Oca-B)  known as the endogenous optimum currency area 
theory. According to Frankel and Rose (1998), the “examination of historical data gives a mislead-
ing picture of a country’s suitability for entry into a currency union, since the OCA criteria are 
endogenous.” In other words, waiting for two economies to be in phase before adopting the same 
currency is only one part of the path towards an OCA since using a common currency will also 
force the economies to become an OCA. 
 
We can already find a similar argument in Mundell (1973a, 1973b): if countries adopt a common 
currency without substantial changes to their purchasing parities, and thereby eliminate uncer-
tainty in the exchange rate, then they gain a better allocation of capital. Although this is not yet 
the endogenous OCA (since Mundell argues that purchasing parities should demonstrate some 
steadiness over time), he nevertheless emphasizes that gains in terms of allocation of capital are 
necessary to help create an OCA. 
 
We can also find the e-OCA already in the European Commission (1990)’s report stating that the 
EMU will reduce the incidence of country-specific shocks. 
 
According to Frankel and Rose (1998), endogeneity comes from the fact that “Entry into a curren-
cy union may raise international trade linkages … more importantly, tighter international trade 
ties can be expected to affect the nature of national business cycles.” Further studies, for example 
Devereux and Engel (2002) or Borda and Romalis (2003), have developed empirical analyses of 
the e-OCA using trade and exchange rate models. The roots of these studies are in the examination 
of the two-way interaction between trade pricing and exchange rate volatility proposed by Bald-
win and Lyons (1993, 1994). 
 
Another noteworthy point in Frankel and Rose (1998) is the difference between trade and 
business cycles:  
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From a theoretical viewpoint, closer international trade could result in either 
tighter or looser correlations of national business cycles. Cycles could, in prin-
ciple, become more idiosyncratic. Closer trade ties could result in countries be-
coming more specialized in the goods in which they have comparative advan-
tage. The countries might then be more sensitive to industry-specific shocks, 
resulting in more idiosyncratic business cycles. However, if demand shocks (or 
other common shocks) predominate, or if intra-industry trade accounts for most 
trade, then business cycles may become more similar across countries when coun-
tries trade more.  
 
The  OCA definition is not related to convergence in business cycles. When policymakers talk 
about the convergence needed to become an OCA, attention should be paid to the type of con-
vergence being considered. In separating convergence in trade from convergence in business 
cycles, Krugman (1993) argues that specialization will occur in Europe due to the reduction of 
transaction costs, which is opposed to the European Commission’s (1990) report.1 Further 
research like Fontagne and Freudenberg (1999) show using bilateral EU trade during 1980-1994 
that the EMU is likely to foster intra-industry trade in Europe, leading to more symmetric shocks 
between member states. In other words, the monetary union will endogenously create the con-
ditions of its success. 
 
For this study, we propose an empirical analysis of the e-OCA through the use of a different proxy 
than the bilateral trade: the bilateral FDI flows. By doing so, we want to measure Mundell’s 
(1973b) intuition about the better allocation of capital that would result from the use of a common 
currency. We use FDI flows as a proxy for the allocation of capital, and – as in Mundell’s (1973b) 
argument – we will consider the exchange rates among other variables. This model conforms 
with the micro-structure approach by Corsetti and Pesenti (2002). 
 
We will use a gravity model to analyze FDI flows. This model is commonly employed in the study 
of international trade. FDI is the movement of production activity across the national border. 
More specifically, FDI is the acquisition of 10 percent or more of foreign firm assets. According to 
Feenstra (1999), this internal activity is significantly different from inter-firm linkages that can be 
established when independent firms interact. The acquisition of a foreign subsidiary for produc-
tion or branch distribution includes benefits such as lower trade costs and information costs. Bar-
rel and Pain (1997) argue that FDI is not simply an alternative method to increase firm production 
capacity, but becomes a channel for the transfer of knowledge capital and transaction technology.  
 
Multinational activity is usually described with reference to ownership-specific advantages, inter-
nalization incentives, and location-specific advantages outlined in Dunning (1981). Ownership-
specific advantages refer to a firm’s propriety rights or exclusive or favorable access to inputs and 
factors of production. Internalization incentives include legal safeguards such as absence of price 
discrimination, institutions that protect property rights, and protection against exploitation 
through government intervention (e.g., tariffs, tax differences, and quotas) to protect the firm. 
Location-specific advantages, the focus of this study, assume firm profitability in producing a 
product in a foreign country rather than simply producing it at home and exporting to the for-
eign market. Transport and communications costs are the most obvious examples. Others include 
input prices, quality and productivity of labor, energy, materials, and intermediate goods as well 
as the distribution of inputs and markets in the production process of firm operation in the for-
eign country.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, location advantages can be divided into two competing argu-
ments. The factor proportions hypothesis, presented in Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), and 
                                                 
1For a more detailed presentation of the debate, see De Grauwe (2003).  
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Helpman and Krugman (1985), states that multinational activity arises only in the presence of 
sufficient differences in factor endowments among countries. When these differences in factor 
prices are equalized across borders, no incentives exist for the firm to maintain a foreign center of 
production. It should be noted that an important limitation to this strand of literature was the 
assumption of zero transportation costs.  
 
The second argument, known as the proximity-concentration hypothesis (Brainard 1993, 1997) 
arose largely as a consequence of the work of Krugman (1991) on positive transportation costs. 
Brainard (1993) combined positive trade costs with the Markusen (1984) framework of symmetric 
factor endowments through a trade-off between multinational firm proximity to a destination 
market and advantages in maintaining plant production abroad to supply the destination market. 
The absence of factor price differentials forces firms to consider the additional fixed cost of a pro-
duction plant abroad versus the additional variable cost of continued exports to supply the for-
eign market.  
 
An extended model, presented in Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) incorporated Brainard’s 
positive transportation costs, but also allowed for asymmetries between countries due to country 
size, factor endowments, and technology. Horizontal expansion by multinational firms is driven 
by an overall large market, and similarities in relative market size, similar labor costs, and high 
transportation costs and tariffs. 
 
According to the convergence criteria, the integration process is focused on inflation, budgetary, 
exchange rate, and interest rate convergence. These criteria account for every aspect necessary for 
monetary, fiscal, and structural stability, yet the effect of these measures on bilateral foreign in-
vestment – largely a microeconomic phenomenon – has not been the focus of past empirical re-
search. The following section presents the model used in this empirical analysis and application 
of the convergence criteria into an econometric framework. 
 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a variant of the gravity model, commonly used to analyze bi-
lateral trade flows.2 The dataset is composed of aggregate annual bilateral flows of foreign direct 
investment between EU-15 members (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United King-
dom). There are N = 14 × 13 = 182 bilateral relations per time period (i.e., aggregated cross-
sections).3 The data cover the period from 1994 to 2000, yielding a total sample of n=182×7=1274 
bilateral observations. Since the dataset includes a few missing observations, the actual dataset is 
slightly smaller and unbalanced.4 
 
The model is estimated using the following gravity equation and includes Hecksher-Ohlin vari-
ables (market size, income similarity, factor endowments, and distance) as well as proxies for 
capturing the European convergence (interest rate difference, budget difference, and debt differ-
ence):  
 
                                                 
2The model was first independently derived by Tinbergen (1962), and Pöyhönen (1963). For a 
theoretical background, see Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1989), and Deardorff (1998). 
3For the empirical study, Belgium and Luxembourg are combined yielding fourteen member 
states. The number of bilateral trading partners is always one less than the number of member 
states because domestic investment is not considered. 
4Note that fourteen cross sections are missing in the dataset. The majority of these bilateral flows 
originate from or are destined to Greece. Therefore, N=168, and n=908.  
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where bilateral country pairs are denoted ij= Austria-Belgium, Austria-Denmark,..., UK-Sweden 
[168], and time t=1994, 1995,...,2000 [7]. The explanatory variables take the following forms:  
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Expected signs are given above the respective coefficient.5 Note that the dependent variable FDI 
represents the flow value rather than stock measurement more commonly used in empirical an-
alysis.6 In this case, FDI flows capture the creation of new linkages between multinational firms 
and foreign affiliates.7 Fixed effects are denoted αs, and recognize country-specific (symmetric) 
heterogeneity, but homogeneity when i = j (i.e. when i =Austria or j =Austria, then the dummy 
variable takes a value of 1, and zero otherwise). Therefore, heterogeneity, models country-specific 
participation or investment intensity instead of modeling heterogeneity between source and host 
countries.8 The error term, εij,t, represents all unobserved bilateral effects. The three Hecksher-
Ohlin variables (G, S, R) resemble the Helpman (1987) specification and are detailed below. 
 
                                                 
5An exchange rate variable and an absolute inflation rate variable were included in the initial an-
alysis to account for all Maastricht Treaty criteria. Both variables yielded statistically insignificant 
results and were excluded from the final model. The exchange rate variable specification is simi-
lar to De Grauwe and Skudelny (2000): 
 
()
()
100
j currency    of amount  i currency    of amount 
j currency    of amount  i currency    of amount 
1994
, × =
t
t ij ER   
Initial regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
6 See Brenton et al. (1999), and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) for empirical research employing FDI 
stock values. 
7 The dependent variable for FDI  is in log form, reflecting only positive investment; 
disinvestment is recorded as 0. Following Chen (2002), a value of 1 is added to each FDI value to 
avoid () 0 ln . This does not bias the estimates as  ( ) ( ) t ij t ij FDI FDI , , ln 1 ln ≈ +  when  , ij t FDI  is large. 
But, where  ( ) 0 ln , = t ij FDI , then  ( ) 0 1 ln , = + t ij FDI . 
8For a generalized fixed effects gravity model, see Baltagi et al. (2003).  
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G is the measure of overall “economic space” that measures market size and therefore serves as a 
proxy for investment that is motivated by market-expansion reasons (Helpman, 1987). The ex-
pected value is positive for investment flows under circumstances of horizontal firm integration. 
 
S is an index that captures the relative size of the two economies that is bounded between 
absolute divergence in size and equality in country size. If two countries have roughly equal GDP, 
the coefficient approaches  ( ) 5 . 0 ln 69 . 0 = − . Perfect dissimilarity yields a coefficient value that 
approaches  () 0 ln .9 A positive coefficient is evidence of horizontal firm integration, as presented 
by Brainard (1997) and Markusen and Venables (1998). Similarity in country size is one of the 
main theoretical determinants of multinational expansion to determine market similarity. 
 
R measures the relative difference between the two countries in terms of relative factor endow-
ments. R in this study is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation and country population. The 
factor endowments variable takes a minimum value of 0, representing equality in relative factor 
endowments, and a maximum value that approaches 1, the largest possible difference in relative 
factor endowments. As mentioned in the preceding section, the importance of factor endowments 
varies significantly depending on the trade theory hypothesis examined. Horizontal firm integra-
tion theory dictates that factor endowment differences are irrelevant and should not be signifi-
cant (or even exist) among developed countries. As the EU represents a set of well-developed and 
relatively wealthy countries, movement toward equalization of relative factor endowments is ex-
pected to yield an increase in bilateral FDI flows. 
 
D denotes the log of the distance between the economic centers of the two countries. Broadly 
speaking, distance is a proxy for trade and transportation costs, which has a negative impact on 
investment and trade flows. Markusen and Venables (2000) argue that distance is not relevant, 
but transportation costs are important for entry of multinational firms. Investment that promotes 
production for the foreign market a priori should not be greatly influenced by distance. Yet, if 
distance and transportation costs are inextricably linked, the coefficient on D should be negative. 
The costs associated with distance, such as communication and coordination costs, reduce in-
centives to new investment.10 
 
IRDIF is the difference in interest rates between country i and j. The interest rate measures the 
long-term cost of borrowing. A negative coefficient is expected. Financing of assets and affiliate 
purchases is likely to come from both the source or target country; convergence in rates of both 
markets would see an increase in investor confidence and positive FDI flows. In other words, 
convergence could likely result in tight correlation of the interest rates. 
 
BGTDIF represents the difference in the government budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of 
GDP between the source and host country. A convergence in the balance of the budget surplus is 
expected to increase investment. The intuition behind the expectation is clear: the variable at-
tempts to capture the effect of government fiscal responsibility. Presumably, a multinational firm 
wishing to expand horizontally will be induced to invest in a market characterized by a similarity 
in government finances relative to the source country. 
 
                                                 
9In the case of a country pair approaching perfect dissimilarity, the coefficient approaches -∞. 
10It is worthwhile to point out that if horizontal FDI is aimed as a substitute for exports due in part 
by higher transportation costs, then the expected value should be positive. This argument is in 
line with theory presented in Markusen and Venables (1998). This study does not look at lower 
FDI transportation costs relative to bilateral trade transportation costs; instead, the variable is fo-
cused on measuring significance of absolute barriers to investment.  
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DBTDIF is the difference of the debt-to-GDP ratio between each country pair. This variable repre-
sents long-term stability of the government. Since FDI is considered a long-term transaction (as 
compared to exports, for example), a reduction in the debt differential between countries is likely 
to lead to an increase in investment flows. 
 
Given the longitudinal nature of data, a simple OLS estimate of our model imposes strict restric-
tions that might not be justifiable given the complicated nature of our dataset. Specifically, we ex-
pect both temporally dependent interactions as well as interactions between country panels that 
contradict OLS assumptions. The presence of serial correlation and panel heteroscedasticity were 
of key concern in our estimation of this the model. 
 
A way to check for autocorrelation is to use Baltagi and Wu’s (1999) LBI t e s t  o r  a  m o d i f i e d  
Durbin-Watson test for unequally spaced panel data (Bhargava et al., 1982). If there is auto-
correlation, the option would be fourfold: (1) a dynamic panel model (two-way random effect 
model or error-component model) with first differences, sometimes known as a Prais-Winston 
transformation or a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation; (2) a dynamic model with lagged depend-
ent variables with two slightly different approaches known as one or two step general methods 
of moments (GMM) estimators as in Arellano and Bond (1991) or Arellano and Bover (1995);11 (3) a 
weight-adjusted combination of the White and Newey-West estimator to handle both the het-
eroskedasticity and the autocorrelation in the model; or (4) a feasible generalized least squares 
procedure (FGLS, or a two-state generalized least squares model) as in Parks (1967) and Kmenta 
(1997) in which the model assumes an autoregressive error structure of the first order AR(1), 
along with contemporaneous correlation among cross-sections. 
 
The initial set of OLS estimates was subject to several tests to determine the interaction between 
observations. The assumption of zero autocorrelation was rejected by the Baltagi and Wu (1999) 
LBI test with a test statistic 2.090, while the modified Bhargava et al., (1982) Durbin-Watson 
proved inconclusive for positive serial correlation. Therefore the fourth option above was chosen. 
The model was estimated using the cross-sectionally heteroscedastic and time-wise autoregressive 
model (Kmenta (1997). Unlike pooled OLS estimation, the Kmenta-Parks method employed here 
accounts for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation when present.12  
 
                                                 
11GMM is usually robust to deviations of the underlying data generation process to violations of 
heteroskedasticity and normality, insofar as they are asymptotically normal, but they are not al-
ways the most efficient estimators. 
12First, OLS is used to obtain the regression residuals, which are then used to obtain a transforma-
tion that has an asymptotically non-autoregressive and homoscedastic error term. The other char-
acteristics if the general Kmenta-Parks model are as follows: 
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The Kmenta-Parks model is slightly modified. When T<N (here T=7 and N=168) the following 
assumption is necessary: ( ) 0 , , , = t ji t ij E ε ε , thereby removing the assumption of contemporane-
ous correlation among cross-sections.  
 
While our choice of estimation method is not immune to criticism, such as those found in Beck 
and Katz (1995, 2001), the modified FGLS estimates here perform best because of our concern for 
autocorrelation. One of the main criticisms of the Kmenta-Parks estimates is the possibility of un-
derestimation of standard errors and consequently resulting in an artificially inflated statistical 
significance. Since the FGLS method could be employed either in a fixed effects or random effects 
framework depending upon the underlying behavior of cross-sectional heterogeneity, it is critical 
that an appropriate test be conducted before proceeding with the suitable estimation strategy.13    
 
Lastly, we detail the data sources of the variables. FDI flow data are from the European Union 
Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook (European Commission, 2002a). The flow of FDI is cross-
border investment in which the investor has a long-term interest in an enterprise or market in 
another economy. Investment is composed of two parts: equity capital and other capital. Equity 
capital includes all branches and ordinary shares in subsidiaries and associates. Other capital is 
comprised of inter-company debt, such as loans and trade credits, between the investor and the 
subsidiary (branch or associate). Data are converted from millions of Euros to U.S. dollars using 
the EC average annual exchange rates and weighted with 1995 as the base year by the CPI pro-
vided by the IMF (2003).  
 
GDP data are taken from the World Bank (2003) and expressed in millions of U.S. dollars using 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates. Data are also converted to a 1995 base year through the CPI 
provided by the IMF. The total labor force (used in the capital per worker ratio) is defined as the 
economically active population that contributes to the production of goods and services in the 
formal economy. The variable was obtained from the World Bank.  
 
Distance data were obtained from Jon Haveman’s website.14 The variable is defined as the dis-
tance between the economic center of one country to another. Note that this does not lead to a 
value of 0 when countries are adjacent to each other. In the empirical study, we loosely follow 
Polak (1996), who addresses the built-in bias of the gravity model that is “downward” for “far-
away countries” and “upward” for “close-up countries.” The solution is to make the distance 
variable relative to the size of the host country economy. The variable therefore, is weighted by 
the host country population.  
 
Interest rates represent central government bond yields on the secondary market with a residual 
maturity of ten years (European Commission, 2002b). Budget surplus/deficits as a percentage of 
a country’s GDP were obtained from the IMF. The budget of the consolidated central government 
                                                 
13According to the Hausman specification test, the cross-sectional heterogeneity can be treated as 
random, if the null hypothesis  ( ) 0 , : H , , 0 = ′
t ij t ij E ε Z can not be rejected, signifying a lack of correla-
tion between the explanatory variables and the disturbance term. However, with  6 . 184
2
7 = χ  
which is significant at < .01 level, the stated null hypothesis could be rejected, signifying correla-
tion between the explanatory variables and the disturbance term. Accordingly, a fixed effects 
model is preferred. Specifically, the cross-sectional heterogeneity dimension is captured by em-
ploying thirteen symmetric dummies given a total of fourteen countries included in the sample. 
As suggested by Greene (2003), a maximum likelihood estimation method is employed for ob-
taining the FGLS estimates reported in Table 1.    
14http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/ 
TradeData.html  
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includes operations of budgetary central government, extra budgetary units, and social security 
funds. Debt data are compiled by Eurostat. Debt is defined as consolidated gross debt of the 
central government and subsectors including state government, local government, and social 
security debt. The econometric analysis and discussion of the results are presented in the next 
section. 
 
 
4. Interpretation of the results 
 
Our results suggest that multinational FDI flows can be explained by destination market charac-
teristics such as large, high-income consumer markets and fiscal and structural stability. These 
findings are in line with current theory. The findings here suggest multinational firms are not pri-
marily concerned with lowering labor costs by investing abroad, but are sensitive to communica-
tion and transportation costs that are incurred through firm expansion. The Maastricht conver-
gence criteria are found to have a positive influence on investment: low interest rates, reduction 
in budget deficits, and size limits on government debt all play a significant role in attracting 
multinational firms. Detailed results of our findings are presented in Table 1. 
 
A. Hecksher-Ohlin Variables 
 
As shown in Table 1, the total market size is highly significant. The positive relation between the 
estimated coefficient and the dependent variable can be broadly interpreted as the source coun-
try’s desire to seek out markets that increase the overall access to consumers.  
 
The β2 coefficient is positive, meaning convergence in terms of income between the country pair 
results in an increase in FDI flows. According to these results, multinational firms prefer to invest 
in markets that are similar in size relative to the host country.  
 
The β3 coefficient is negative, but statistically insignificant. The sign of the coefficient suggests 
multinational firms are not likely to expand production across borders strictly on the premise of 
lower labor costs in the country of investment within the European Union.  
 
The findings suggest that transportation costs limit intra-EU investment by multinational firms. 
The  β4 coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Distant markets suffer. Investment, 
therefore, is not a cost-saving measure in the face of high transportation costs. 
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Table 1: FGLS Estimates [Double-Log Specification] 
Dependent Variable:  ( ) t ij FDI , ln . Mean: 4.676, Std. Dev: 2.378 
Variable Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Coefficient z-statistic 
Hecksher-Ohlin Variables 
Market Size  13.644  0.791  6.248*** 12.78 
Market Similarity  -1.187  0.495  3.569*** 13.61 
Factor Endowment  0.724  0.989     -0.115  -1.06 
Distance 4.221  1.309  -0.175*** -4.45 
 
European Convergence Variables 
Interest Rate  1.187  1.857  -0.143*** -10.20 
Budget 2.904  2.171  -0.047*** -4.17 
Debt 25.730  25.337  -0.012*** -9.26 
 
Country Fixed Effects 
Austria     3.172*** 6.97 
Belgium/Luxembourg     5.097*** 12.38 
Denmark     5.533*** 8.95 
Finland     5.409*** 8.80 
France     -0.303*** -2.68 
Germany     -1.134*** -7.20 
Greece     2.963*** 5.85 
Ireland     7.727*** 11.17 
Italy     -0.719*** -5.40 
Netherlands     3.762*** 12.29 
Portugal     3.612*** 7.01 
Spain     0.475*** 2.66 
Sweden     4.301*** 9.15 
Constant     -80.584*** -11.52 
n =908                                             Likelihood Ratio ~ 084 . 350
2
20 = χ *** 
*** <.01 significance     
 
 
B. European Convergence Variables 
 
A decrease in the long-term interest rate in the source and host countries lowers the cost of bor-
rowing for multinational firms. Specifically, firms that are headquartered in the source country 
are willing to finance investment projects in either the destination market or the source market. 
Consequently, equalization of financing costs tends to increase the inflow of investment into the 
host country.  
 
Fiscal responsibility plays a significant role in the economy of the target country as a means to at-
tract inflows of foreign investment. A negative β6 coefficient implies that convergence of govern-
ment fiscal policy increases FDI flows between the country pair.  
 
Similarly, management of government debt is also a significant determinant of FDI flows. The 
negative coefficient β7 implies that levels of government debt that are similar across countries 
tend to attract multinational investment. 
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C. Country Fixed Effects 
 
Lastly, we briefly mention the symmetric country dummy variables that proxy country partici-
pation (both inflow and outflow) of FDI within the region. Interestingly, the most active countries 
in terms of multinational investment during the period observed have been Ireland, Denmark, 
Finland, and Belgium/Luxembourg. These findings are plausible as, comparatively speaking; the 
home markets of these countries are small relative to those of the region’s larger economies. Con-
sequently, multinational firms based in those countries would be the most willing to expand to 
other markets.  
 
 
5. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
The primary results of this empirical analysis find evidence of growing horizontal integration of 
the EU-15 based predominantly on market access and consumer income. These intra-industry 
linkages are the main factors that deepen market integration and allow for synchronization of de-
mand and trade-based shocks. The magnitude of the Hecksher-Ohlin variables, specifically mar-
ket size and income similarity, allows for a more visible role in determining the creation of hori-
zontal linkages. The statistical significance of the European convergence variables suggests that 
Europe is becoming an optimum currency area in terms of allocation of capital as formulated in 
Mundell (1973a). 
 
Defined in terms of allocation of capital, convergence also seems to have occurred. This supports 
the European Commission’s (1990) view, instead of Krugman’s (1993) comparative argument. 
 
The convergence process of the European member states in the 1990s presents several factors that 
will guide the future entry of member countries into the monetary union. In May 2004, the Euro-
pean Union expanded to include ten Central and Eastern European accession candidates. The 
findings here suggest key characteristics that are necessary to attract intra-EU multinational in-
vestment during their accession into the EMU.  
 
Recent studies by Brenton et al. (1999) and Janicki and Wunnava (2004) show that trade between 
the European Union and these accession candidates is still based primarily on differences in fac-
tor endowments – such as labor costs – where production is aimed at re-export back to the EU 
market, rather than consumption in the candidate countries. Brenton et al. (1999) refer to this as 
the integration of the accession candidates into the European production process. The results pre-
sented here, however, suggest that the structure of current EU production process is quite differ-
ent. The entry of the accession candidates into the EMU will depend not on the timetable pre-
sented by the European Commission; entry will depend on the development of intra-industry 
linkages and the continued creation of horizontal intensity of investment. 
 
Future empirical research could be useful in further exploring the convergence hypothesis pre-
sented in Markusen and Venables (1996). Specifically, the results here follow the hypothesis sug-
gesting growth in multinational firms is determined by convergence of income levels, relative 
factor endowments, and size. A future analysis of intra- European imports and exports in model-
ing domestic firm behavior might be useful in finding further support in an empirical study of 
European convergence relative to growth in multinational firm activity. 
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